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Regulatory compliance is a significant element of environmental security, the safeguarding of stable state 
revenues and the achievement of other key public objectives. Capital market effects of enforcement have received 
a lot of attention, but it has not been much reviewed and explored within the scope of Indonesian capital market. 
Specifically, this research aims to provide an in-depth review of the regulatory sanction imposed on a major audit 
firm in Indonesia and to analyze the impact of investor valuations by looking at the stock prices of each client 
company of the audit firm. We examine the stock market effects of the regulatory sanction imposed upon one of 
the Big Four auditors in Indonesia, namely KAP Tanubrata, Sutanto, Fahmi, Bambang & Rekan as a member of 
BDO International Limited for actions related to its audit of PT Garuda Indonesia (Persero) Tbk (Garuda 
Indonesia). The shares of 37 BDO auditees and 37 non-BDO auditees are analyzed and their respective cumulative 
abnormal returns (CAR) are calculated in order to observe their reaction upon the event, i.e. the imposition of 
sanction by regulator towards BDO. Two event windows are examined in our analysis - April 26th, 2019 is the 
date on which the issue was informally reported by the media/press and June 28th, 2019 is the date on which the 
regulator officially imposes its sanction. Using the event study methodology, we calculated the CAR and obtained 
results that showed significant differences in the CAR figures for BDO and non-BDO clients. Our findings suggest 
that a significant difference in the CARs of BDO and non-BDO clients only exists over a brief period of time, 
indicating a lack of major concerns for the case. Therefore, we see that BDO has no reputational loss in relation 
to the Garuda Indonesia case, both on informal and formal dates. 




Auditors, notably external auditors, occupies a substantial role in assuring that financial reports of their clients are 
complete, accurate and are free of material misstatements. They must ensure that every statements of their clients 
are presented in accordance with the applicable accounting framework and ensure that true and fair results are 
presented on the record. Furthermore, it is the responsibility of external auditors to certify the financial statements 
of the firms they audit. Certain investors and lenders required this certification for their analysis. This places 
immense pressure on auditors because failure in providing their clients with adequate certification may have a 
detrimental impact on the firms they audit and the surrounding economy. Auditors are demanded to apply adequate 
skepticism to accounting estimates and treatments and also address every shortcomings detected, so that investors 
and other interested parties can have confidence in the quality of the information contained in the auditor's report. 
An issue that has posed significant concerns about the audit quality of one of the Big Four audit firms in Indonesia 
has recently occurred. This research raises the issue of sanction imposed by regulator to one of the Big Four 
auditors in Indonesia, namely KAP Tanubrata, Sutanto, Fahmi, Bambang & Rekan as a member of BDO 
International in Indonesia. The imposition of sanctions by the regulator is due to the finding of financial statements 
engineering in Garuda Indonesia's financial statements. BDO Indonesia, as the auditors of Garuda Indonesia in 
the period, are considered negligent in identifying and detecting misstatements in Garuda Indonesia's financial 
statements. Consequently, Financial Services Authority (FSA, originally referred to as Otoritas Jasa 
Keuangan/OJK) imposed their sanctions to BDO Indonesia in the form of a written monition to amend its quality 
control policies and procedures, and also a one-year suspension on the Notification of Registration to one of the 
partners at BDO Indonesia. 
The exposure of a firm's wrongdoing may cause reputational harm to the firm, which can further impact the firm's 
operation. The three categories which may indicate that impairment of a firm occurs includes financial strain 
(monetary sanctions) incurred by the detection of financial infringements, an increase in the cost of capital due to 
the provisions to do business with a sanctioned firm, and news of firm violations that can reduce the number of 
existing and future clients (Karpoff, 2012). 
Previous research in many countries have discussed capital market effects to regulatory action/enforcement, some 
of which are research in United States (Pacini & Hillison, 2003), France (Kirat & Rezaee, 2019), United Kingdom 
(Armour, Mayer, & Polo, 2017), Germany (Weber, Willenborg, & Zhang, 2008), Japan (Numata & Takeda, 2010), 
and China (Chen, Firth, Gao, & Rui, 2005). However, this discussion has not been much reviewed and explored 
within the scope of the Indonesian capital market. Specifically, this research aims to evaluate the regulatory 
sanctions levied on a major audit firm in Indonesia by looking at the investor valuations through the stock prices 
of client of the firm. 
The article proceeds as follows: The next section offers a brief overview of stock market reaction and audit quality. 
Section 3 presents data and methodology. Section 4 presents and discusses the empirical results and discusses 
them. Section 5 provides conclusion and recommendation. 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1. Stock Market Reaction 
The absorption of information in the market is based on the signaling theory and the concept of the efficient 
marketing hypothesis. Signaling theory demonstrates the value of information issued by a firm for the purpose of 
investment decisions. Information is a prominent element for investors as it provides notes and descriptions of the 
past, present and future for firms and the capital market. Information may provide a signal for investors in making 
investment decisions. Market is expected to react to certain information with value, where market participants 
will then interpret and analyze the information as a good signal or a bad signal. Investors, in this case, may 
immediately capture any signal that tends to increase their knowledge of a firm and adjust the share price 
immediately thereafter (Kirat & Rezaee, 2019). 
On the other hand, Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) states that financial markets provide efficient information 
(Fama, 1970). This means that investors value the share price of a firm according to available public financial 
information (Wetterlind Dörner, 2005). Thus, it is impossible to consistently outperform the market, unless 
someone may have the same information as the market or there is a luck factor. This is because the efficiency 
created by 'core work' in the stock market means that the current stock price may invariably reflect and include 
all relevant and practical information (Azzam & Karlquist, 2008). 
Market reaction of a firm to any information is indicated by a change in the share price of the firm itself. This 
reaction can be measured by using return as the value of price changes or by abnormal returns. Through abnormal 
return, any event that contains information may provide abnormal return to the market. Conversely, those that do 
not contain information may not provide an abnormal return to the market (Hartono, 2010). Abnormal return is 
highly necessary in determining performance according to portfolio risk when compared to the reference index or 
the market as a whole. Abnormal return can also describe whether investors receive adequate compensation for 
the assumed investment risk. Studies based on abnormal returns have been applied in an effort to verify various 
events in many studies in the field of corporate finance or financial economics (Jeng, 2015). Further information 
regarding the observation of market reaction using (cumulative) abnormal return is presented in the next section 
(see section 3.2 Cumulative Abnormal Return). 
2.2. Audit Quality: Reputation Rationale and Insurance Rationale 
Audit quality is essential to the acceptance of a firm's audit services and its reputation in the market. Recent 
research on accounting/auditing domain has therefore discussed audit quality through two primary motivations, 
i.e. "reputation rationale" and "insurance rationale" (Dee, Lulseged, & Zhang, 2011; Frendy & Hu, 2014; Skinner 
& Srinivasan, 2012; Weber et al., 2008). 
Reputation rationale is related to the prominent role of auditors in alleviating agency problems among managers, 
owners and creditors of enterprises due to the presence of information asymmetries. To reduce costly decision-
making problems and reduce agency costs, managers need to subject to monitoring by auditors and/or financial 
institutions to obtain their certification (Numata & Takeda, 2010). Therefore, hiring auditors with excellent 
reputations may assist the firm, notably management, to ensure that all reports published by the firm are accurate 
and reliable (Dee et al., 2011). 
Insurance rationale, on the other hand, linked to the role of the auditor to provide insurance to investors when 
there is a loss due to the misrepresentation of financial statements (Numata & Takeda, 2010). Auditors are also 
required to become the 'insurance' in the case when a firm is involved in a litigation. Auditors are considered more 
capable of identifying material misstatements and are professionally more impeccable, so that they can mitigate 
any conditions required to achieve a successful litigation (Weber et al., 2008). Larger audit firms tend to set higher 
fees for their services. Larger firm size and the "deeper pockets" of a firm are associated with greater incentives 
to provide high quality audit services (Weber et al., 2008). 
2.3. Hypothesis Development 
Regulators may issue their enforcement action when a firm commits any violation, including financial statement 
falsification, overstatement of asset and income, and inadequate disclosure (Rollins & Bremser, 1997). 
Enforcement actions have the potential to provide new information for auditors and clients, and thus changes their 
perception on one another. For auditors, this action can be interpreted as a sign that clients carry different business 
risks than previously expected. For clients, this action requires them to adjust their expectations about the quality 
of the work of the auditors they use. Enforcement actions increase the likelihood of negative consequences such 
as lawsuits or reputational damage for auditors and clients (Brocard, Franke, & Voeller, 2018). 
Bad news regarding audit firm/auditor may be detrimental to the reputation of the firm, as this may be interpreted 
by investors as evidence that the firm has conducted a low-quality audit (Dee et al., 2011; Weber et al., 2008). 
Investors may then question the reliability of audited financial reports issued by other firms (audited by the same 
audit firm) - including those without any audit failure issue. Investors may instantly revise their view towards the 
(audit) firm's client. Previous research have shown that enforcement actions to audit firms have negative impact 
on stock prices, and that it may cause hesitancy towards the accuracy of its client firms’ audited financial 
statements and affects these firms negatively (Chen et al., 2005; Krishnamurthy, Zhou, & Zhou, 2006). 
The two interrelated theories of reputation rationale and insurance rationale have been linked to client market 
reactions when investors are aware of detrimental information about the reputation or sustainability of an audit 
firm (Dee et al., 2011; Frendy & Hu, 2014; Pacini & Hillison, 2003). News of regulatory actions against audit 
firms can lead to increased litigation against auditors. Disclosure of negative information about auditors may cause 
investor to revise their view of the (audit) firm's clients on the basis of (1) reputational motive - loss of confidence 
in the accuracy of other firm's (auditee) financial statements due to damage to the auditor's reputation or (2) 
insurance motive - concern about the litigation against auditors originating from the events disclosed (Dee et al., 
2011; Numata & Takeda, 2010; Weber et al., 2008). 
We thereby hypothesize that the imposition of sanctions by regulators indicates that the audit firm provides its 
client with poor audit quality and generates doubt as to the quality of the financial reporting. We expect that the 
share price of the BDO auditees will be/adversely affected. In this research, we examine the shares of BDO 
auditees (with non-BDO clients as their counterparts) when the media first reported the news about BDO related 
to the Garuda Indonesia case and when the sanction was officially imposed by the regulator upon BDO, since 
these events are useful in identifying the economic significance of the auditor's reputation. 
HYPOTHESIS. BDO auditees experienced a more adverse, negative abnormal return when compared to non-
BDO auditees in both event studied, i.e. when news of BDO Indonesia (associated with the case 
of Garuda Indonesia) was made public and when the regulator officially imposed its sanction. 
3. METHODS 
3.1. Event Study Methodology 
Event study methodology can be used to identify abnormal returns when an event is occurred. Events can be 
identified through a newspaper release or the issuance of a notice by an enforcement agency or any other type of 
information-providing mechanism (Kirat & Rezaee, 2019). We use event study method to analyze the day-to-day 
movement of abnormal returns around the period in which the regulator imposes its sanctions on BDO Indonesia. 
This study examines this through two event windows, i.e. informal date and formal date. The informal date is 
intended to be the initial date on which cases or news regarding BDO Indonesia (in relation to Garuda Indonesia) 
are published in the media/press, while the formal date is the date on which the regulator through its official 
account/channel imposes its sanctions upon BDO Indonesia. The determination of both event windows analyzed 
in this research is shown in detail in Table 1 below. 
Table 1. Event Windows 
 t-10 t0 t+10 
Informal date April 9, 2019 April 26, 2019 May 13, 2019 
Formal date June 13, 2019 June 28, 2019 July 12, 2019 
 
The event window studied in this research was 21 days. The event day on each window is represented as t0, the 
initial date of the observation as t-10, and the end date of the observation as t+ 10. To avoid confounding effects, 
we decided to analyze the event on this short-length observation. 
3.2. Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) 
We employ the standard event study methodology to evaluate the stock price reaction with regard to the public 
announcement of misconduct by an audit firm and sanctions imposed by regulators for such errors. 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression model is the most popular approach used to estimate the relationship 
between stock price and market return. The relationship is then used to estimate expected returns. The so-called 
market model is calculated by this formula: 
𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑚𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡   (1) 
We then calculate the abnormal return around both events of informal and formal date. We used a traditional 
market model to see the effect of these events on the stock return of the sampled firms. The following equation 
defined the measurement of abnormal return for firm i at day t. 
𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − (?̂?𝑖 + ?̂?𝑖𝑅𝑚𝑡) (2) 
Where Rit are the returns on the stock of firm i on day t and Rmt are the index of market returns on day t. The 
coefficient αi and βi are estimated from an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression of Rit on Rmt using a 21-day 
period consisting of days -10 to +10 relative to both event date. 
Lastly, cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for each firm is also calculated by summing up the abnormal returns 







𝑡=1   (3) 
3.3. Sample Selection 
The population in this study are the stocks of firms from all sectors listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX). 
We applied purposive sampling method to obtain the research sample. The sampling criteria are presented in detail 
through Table 2. 
Table 2. Sample Selection Criteria 
 No. of Firms 
BDO Indonesia clients (source: IDX) 42  
Firms with insufficient or missing return data on IDX (5)  
Sample with available returns 37  
Non-BDO clients (comparative firms)  37  
Final sample 74  
 
Our sample consist of 74 firms in total. We have ensured that the 2018-2019 financial statements of each firms 
are available to obtain information about external auditors who carry out audit work. Financial reports are also 
used to identify the industry and firm size of each company. We have also ensured that each of client (BDO 
auditees) and their comparative firms (non-BDO auditees) are of the same size and classified in the same industry. 
Financial reports and share prices are obtained from the Indonesia Stock Exchange website. Firms must have 
return data for the period of the event and at least 21 days during the event window. 
4. FINDINGS 
4.1. Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics is reported in Table 3. As shown in the table, the mean CAR of BDO auditees before the 
date of media publication was -0.0011, increasing in the period after the date of media publication at 0.0005. 
However, it again shows a decrease in the mean CAR on the period before and after the date of the official 
regulatory sanction from 0.0009 to -0.0004. The minimum CAR of BDO auditees before the date of media 
publication is -0.013, while the maximum value is 0.010. Within the period before the date of the imposition of 
sanctions by the regulator, the minimum and maximum CAR values of BDO auditees are -0.008 and 0.020, 
respectively. Whereas in non-BDO auditees, the minimum and maximum CAR values are -0.010 and 0.018, 
respectively. The mean of non-BDO auditees are 0.0009 before the regulatory sanction was officially issued and 
decreased to -0.0004 after the sanction was issued.  
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics 
  Event I: Media Publication 
(Informal Date) 
Event II: Official Sanction Issued 





 Pre-event Post-event Pre-event Post-event 
N 37 [37] 
Min -0.013  [-0.013] -0.010 [-0.014] -0.008 [-0.010] -0.015 [-0.039] 
Max 0.010  [0.013] 0.012 [0.020] 0.020 [0.018] 0.014 [0.009] 
Mean -0.0011 [0.0001] 0.0005 [0.0014] 0.0009 [0.0013] -0.0004 [-0.0024] 
SD 0.0049  [0.0065] 0.0050 [0.0072] 0.0063 [0.0047] 0.0054 [0.0077] 
 
Figure 1 shows the number of firms sampled for this research. The majority of firms are firms categorized in the 
property, real estate and building construction industry, of which 9 are BDO auditees and 9 are non-BDO auditees. 
This number is then followed by the consumer goods industry with a total of 12 firms. Industries with the least 
number of firms are miscellaneous industry and agriculture with a total of 4 firms, respectively. 
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We begin this part by presenting the non-parametric Wilcoxon rank sum test of BDO auditees' abnormal returns 
before and after the informal and formal date. Informal date is the date on which the first case regarding BDO and 
Garuda Indonesia was reported in the media/press. It can be seen in Table 4 below, that there is a decrease in 
negative CAR numbers on the pre-event to the post-event of the informal date. There is also no difference on the 
median CAR for the two periods before and after the informal date. The p-value obtained through the Wilcoxon 
sum rank test of 0.729 indicates that there is no difference in the CAR of BDO auditees before and after the 
publication of news regarding BDO's role in the Garuda Indonesia case. The formal date is intended as the date 
on which sanction are formally enforced by the regulator through its official account/channel/website. Table 4 
also shows that there is no significant change in the percentage of negative CAR figures. The mean CAR of BDO 
auditees has decreased from 0.0009 at the time before the imposition of sanctions by regulators to -0.0004 at the 
time after the imposition of sanctions by the regulator. The p-value of 0.757 indicates that there is no significant 
difference in the CAR of BDO auditees before and after the sanction imposed by the regulator. 
Table 4. CAR – Pre vs. Post-event [BDO Auditees only] 
 N Negative 
(%) 




test p value 
Informal Date       
Pre-event 37 54.59 -0.0011 -0.0010 0.0314 
0.729 
Post-event 37 51.08 0.0005 -0.0010 0.0269 
Formal Date       
Pre-event 37 49.19 0.0009 0.0003 0.0330 
0.757 
Post-event 37 49.46 -0.0004 0.0002 0.0298 
 
Table 5 and 6 presents mean and median CAR for BDO and non-BDO auditee around the informal (April 26, 
2019) and formal date (June 28, 2019). We report the results in seven different windows. Panels A, B, C, D, E, F 
and G are the results of calculating the comparison of CAR (BDO vs. non-BDO auditee) on one-day (day 0, the 
event day), two-day (day -1, 0), two-day (day 0, +1), three-day (day -1, +1), four-day (day -3,0), four-day (day 0, 
+3) and six-day (day 0, +5) windows, respectively. The mean and median CARs for BDO and non-BDO auditees 
are significantly different in two windows (Panel A with p-value of 0.001 and Panel B with p-value of 0.007). 
However, in these two windows, the CAR for BDO auditees are significantly bigger in value than those of the 
non-BDO auditees. 
Table 5. CAR – BDO vs. Non-BDO Auditees [Informal Date] 





Mean CAR Median CAR 
Standard 
Deviation 
BDO 37 32.43 0.0066 0.0051 0.0200 
Non-BDO 37 72.97 -0.0149 -0.0036 0.0439 
Wilcoxon sum rank 
test p value 
  0.001*   





Mean CAR Median CAR 
Standard 
Deviation 
BDO 37 47.30 0.0023 0.0018 0.0196 
Non-BDO 37 63.51 -0.0099 -0.0024 0.0367 
Wilcoxon sum rank 
test p value 
  0.007*   





Mean CAR Median CAR 
Standard 
Deviation 
BDO 37 41.89 0.0006 0.0019 0.0238 
Non-BDO 37 55.41 -0.0009 -0.0010 0.0420 
Wilcoxon sum rank 
test p value 
  0.145   





Mean CAR Median CAR 
Standard 
Deviation 
BDO 37 48.65 -0.0003 0.0011 0.0221 
Non-BDO 37 54.95 -0.0023 -0.0009 0.0376 
Wilcoxon sum rank 
test p value 
  0.361   





Mean CAR Median CAR 
Standard 
Deviation 
BDO 37 50.68 -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0253 
Non-BDO 37 56.76 -0.0035 -0.0015 0.0390 
Wilcoxon sum rank 
test p value 
  0.323   





Mean CAR Median CAR 
Standard 
Deviation 
BDO 37 44.59 0.0013 0.0017 0.0245 
Non-BDO 37 52.03 0.0018 -0.0005 0.0486 
Wilcoxon sum rank 
test p value 
  0.982   





Mean CAR Median CAR 
Standard 
Deviation 
BDO 37 46.85 0.0007 0.0011 0.0253 
Non-BDO 37 55.41 0.0005 -0.0012 0.0441 
Wilcoxon sum rank 
test p value 
  0.734   
 
Table 6 below shows the non-parametric Wilcoxon rank sum test of BDO and non-BDO auditees' abnormal 
returns before and after the imposition of sanction by regulator. The only significant difference was found on 
Panel E (Day -3, 0), which is significant at a 5 per cent level. We also discovered that the mean CARs of BDO 
auditees are lower in number and negative than CARs of non-BDO clients across all the windows in Table 6. 
Within the formal date, the mean CAR values for BDO (non-BDO) auditees across all the windows were -0.0050 
(0.0103), -0.0035 (0.0012), -0.0039 (0.0070), -0.0032 (0.0020), -0.0017 (0.0041), -0.0012 (0.0017), and -0.0016 
(0.0023). 
Table 6. CAR – BDO vs. Non-BDO Auditees [Formal Date] 





Mean CAR Median CAR 
Standard 
Deviation 
BDO 37 48.65 -0.0050 0.0019 0.0316 
Non-BDO 37 48.65 0.0103 0.0005 0.0464 
Wilcoxon sum rank 
test p value 
  0.769   





Mean CAR Median CAR 
Standard 
Deviation 
BDO 37 55.41 -0.0035 -0.0010 0.0274 
Non-BDO 37 52.70 0.0012 -0.0011 0.0376 
Wilcoxon sum rank 
test p value 
  0.874   





Mean CAR Median CAR 
Standard 
Deviation 
BDO 37 50.00 -0.0039 0.0001 0.0350 
Non-BDO 37 54.05 0.0070 -0.0009 0.0478 
Wilcoxon sum rank 
test p value 
  0.455   





Mean CAR Median CAR 
Standard 
Deviation 
BDO 37 54.05 -0.0032 -0.0013 0.0314 
Non-BDO 37 54.95 0.0020 -0.0012 0.0417 
Wilcoxon sum rank 
test p value 
  0.982   





Mean CAR Median CAR 
Standard 
Deviation 
BDO 37 50.68 -0.0017 -0.0001 0.0307 
Non-BDO 37 49.32 0.0041 0.0002 0.0382 
Wilcoxon sum rank 
test p value 
  0.028*   





Mean CAR Median CAR 
Standard 
Deviation 
BDO 37 52.03 -0.0012 -0.0002 0.0346 
Non-BDO 37 53.38 0.0017 -0.0009 0.0560 
Wilcoxon sum rank 
test p value 
  0.645   





Mean CAR Median CAR 
Standard 
Deviation 
BDO 37 52.25 -0.0016 -0.0003 0.0312 
Non-BDO 37 51.80 0.0023 -0.0002 0.0481 
Wilcoxon sum rank 
test p value 
  0.122   
 
The result in Table 5 may imply that investors react rationally due to several reasons. Investors do not seem to 
consider the news disclosing BDO's misconduct as negative news. There is a possibility that investors perceive 
this as a good signal that, as a result of the misconduct, BDO may need to strengthen and improve their internal 
control. 
Based on these findings, we assume several matters about the rational actions of investors towards the events we 
studied. First, investors did not perceived the news of BDO (in connection with the Garuda Indonesia case) as bad 
news. With the disclosure of this case, investors expect BDO to have higher quality as regulators/law enforcers 
requires the firm to improve its internal control. Second, the possibility of a larger event is present in both event 
date, which may reduce investors' attention to the issues we pose in this research. Thirdly, certain investors are 
likely to have an unreasonable mindset where their investment practices are conducted at random and uncorrelated. 
Fourth, investors consider the limitations of financial statement audit in the light of audit failure. Audit procedures 
require a significant level of materiality and a substantial risk assessment with respect to management assertions. 
In a large and complex firm, it is likely that certain immaterial accounts are missed. For this reason, investors act 
rationally by understanding the circumstances that audit failure issue may likely occur at a low frequency in a 
long run (Chen et al., 2005). 
Meanwhile, the only significant, negative difference on day (-3, 0) on the abnormal returns of BDO and non-BDO 
auditees indicates a lack of major concern to the case. Hence, we may conclude that BDO has no reputational loss 
in relation to the Garuda Indonesia case, both on informal and formal dates. 
Previous research has proven that reputational losses due to errors impacting clients, suppliers, or investors of a 
firm have a large and significant impact, while reputational losses related to errors involving third parties (such 
as market participants in general or society in general) have little impact and not significant (Armour et al., 2017; 
Murphy, Shrieves, & Tibbs, 2009). The finding of this research complements previous empirical studies that have 
shown market non-reaction to other events associated with regulatory sanction and auditor reputational loss 
(Barbera & Martinez, 2006; Frendy & Hu, 2014; Kirat & Rezaee, 2019; Soepriyanto & Zudana, 2020). 
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
We investigated the impact of regulatory sanction and the subsequent decline on auditees' stock prices and 
contrasted with those of non-auditees, using events related to the BDO-Garuda Indonesia case. We have collected 
stock market prices of the sampled firms during two events: the announcement of misconduct on media/press and 
official imposition of sanction from the regulator. Through an event study approach, we assess the impact of these 
events on the stock prices of BDO auditees and non-auditees. The event study enables us to isolate abnormal 
returns which are resulted from the events around the two events (t-10 to t+10). 
The result indicate a significant difference on the stock prices of BDO and non-BDO auditees only in a brief of 
time around the two event date. Within the period when BDO-Garuda Indonesia case was announced in the 
media/press, the CAR of BDO auditees were significantly bigger in value than those of the non-BDO auditees. 
This result suggest that investors do not value the announcement of misconduct as a negative news. 
However, a distinct fact occurred within the period when regulator imposed their sanction on BDO, in which the 
mean CAR of BDO auditees were more adversely affected than those of the non-BDO auditees. We observe a 
decrease in BDO auditees' stock prices only in a brief period of time around the period of event (days -3 to 0), 
indicating a lack of major concern for the case. Hence, we may conclude that no reputational loss on BDO in 
relation to the Garuda Indonesia case, both on informal and formal dates. 
We only analyze 10 days before and 10 days after the event date for the estimation period. Further research is 
expected to extend this window to capture the possibility of major unpredictable investor reactions. Future studies 
is also expected to further examine this topic with a more comprehensive discussion, for example by using control 
variables to support the empirical analysis that have been carried out. This research can be an evaluation for 
regulators to consider the types or forms of sanctions imposed on firms/business actors that breach the laws. A 
number of audit firms in Indonesia have recently been subject to enforcement action by regulators, therefore it is 
best that these audit firms concentrate more on improving the quality of their audit services. 
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